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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the intelligence cycle with 
emphasis on the dissemination of data from the intelligence 
community to forward deployed operators, also known as the 
warfighters.  The study focuses on the bottlenecks and other 
flaws within the IC that may cause delays in getting 
intelligence reports and products in support of national 
security to customers around the globe.  The IC has 
undergone several changes since the 2001 terror attacks on 
the United States, thanks to the 9/11 Commission and the 
2004 Intelligence Reform Act.  These changes have 
streamlined bureaucratic processes and budget allocations, 
but there is still a need to acquire systems and software 
that maximize data transfer and security.  Several 
commercial companies have designed collaborative tools that 
claim to support improved data handling.  Intelligence 
Support Server Environment (ISSE) guard is the primary tool 
the US Air Force employs for exchanging data between the IC 
and the operators.  This thesis will review the advertised 
upgrade to ISSE along with other tools and provide an 
unbiased perspective on how these tools might facilitate 
data dissemination to the warfighters. 
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A. COORDINATION GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND 
OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
Intelligence can drive national security operations, 
and national security operations can drive intelligence 
collection and reporting.  The Intelligence Community (IC) 
and government or military operators share an interdependent 
partnership that is essential to United States national 
security.   Immediately upon identification of a threat to 
US interest or to national security the IC is tasked to 
examine, analyze and further develop the knowledge base on 
any potential adversary.  Simultaneously, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) delegates authority to the theater commander 
or the most appropriate government organization to train, 
organize or prepare to conduct operations against that 
threat as necessary. 
The quality of cooperation between the IC and the 
operators has fluctuated since 1947, when the IC was first 
established.  IC-Operator tension seems to rise during 
crises, while collaboration tends to strengthen during 
peacetimes.  But before the external relationships can be 
considered, first the internal issues need to be addressed.  
Among the IC, there are two distinct functions.  One 
function is collecting intelligence and the other is 
processing the intelligence (analyze, fuse and produce 
multi-source intelligence products).  The major intelligence 
collecting and processing organizations will be discussed 
later.  The point to make here is that there are separate 
organizations which collect, categorize and initially 
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disseminate the intelligence to predetermined distribution 
lists for further analysis.  These lists are typically 
established when national intelligence agencies coordinate 
at executive levels and commit to disseminate the 
preliminary intelligence to limited customers among the 16 
members of the IC. (Figure 1) It is possible at this point 
to see the looming quandary with this process; intelligence 
is collected and primarily distributed to other intelligence 
organizations, not to the warfighters.  Eventually, the 
intelligence is further processed and pushed to the tactical 
units, but there is a recognized delay. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency Covert actions, global all-source collection 
and analysis 
National Security Agency Signals Intelligence, global collection and 
analysis of communications 
Defense Intelligence Agency Support to DoD and Defense Attaches 
National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency 
Prepares geospatial data, maps, charts and 
targeting data 
National Reconnaissance Office  Develops and operates reconnaissance 
satellites 
Department of Homeland Security Fuses law enforcement and intelligence, 
counterterrorism 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterintelligence, counterterrorism 
Energy Department Reports on foreign nuclear weapons programs, 
nonproliferation 
State Department Analytical diplomatic reporting 
Treasury Department Monitors US monetary policies, terrorist 
financing 
Drug Enforcement Agency Counter-narcotics 
Air Force Intelligence 
Army Intelligence 
Navy Intelligence 
Marine Corps Intelligence 
Coast Guard Intelligence 
 
Intelligence support to service specific 
missions, supplement CIA analysts on variety 
of technical  reporting 
Figure 1.   Intelligence Community and Their Primary Tasks1 
                     
1 Richard A. Best, CRS Report RL33539, Intelligence Issues for 
Congress (110th Congress), August 7, 2007. 
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As the IC and the tasked operators progress towards 
confronting the same opponent, one would think there would 
be an ongoing exchange of communication and coordination.  
Often that is not the case.  Because of the latency in 
pushing the intelligence reports outside of the IC, 
operators will establish their own, seemingly more efficient 
intelligence resources, resulting in the IC and the 
operators developing independent dossiers and solutions for 
targets, based on their separate sources and analysis.2  
Better crosstalk and harmonization of effort is vital to 
synchronize the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 
(IPB) and to maximize IC and operational efforts and assets. 
B. INTERAGENCY AND MULTIPLE-DOMAIN TRANSMISSION BARRIERS 
The two types of intelligence organizations were 
already mentioned, the collections agencies and the 
processing agencies.  Unfortunately, within these 
bureaucratic organizations, there are multiple technological 
and security barriers that prevent the optimal exchange of 
data.  There are even more layers of obstruction beyond the 
IC.   Military components and paramilitary organizations 
require real-time intelligence but utilize various non-
collaborative software and systems.  In addition, customers 
outside of the IC have non-traditional procedures when 
handling and managing intelligence products, which 
introduces the potential for increased security risks 
associated with disseminating the intelligence across 
                     
2 Tactical operators are required to complete mission reports 
(misreps) that are often, in turn, used by that same tactical unit to 
conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).  Circular 
reporting exacerbates the problem of tactical units disregarding 
national intelligence and instead using locally derived data. 
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multiple domains.  Increased security risks cause delays in 
distributing sensitive data.  The customer is required to 
verify their methods of secure data handling.    
1. Technological Difficulties 
Compatible technology is critical in sending customer 
requests for information to the collectors and disseminating 
intelligence to the field sites.  Intelink, National Signals 
Database (NSD), RADIANT MERCURY and Integrated Broadcast 
Service (IBS) are just a few of the major systems used by 
the IC to transfer data.  There are over 100 software 
programs used to disseminate intelligence between the IC and 
joint service customers.3  In addition, each DoD service 
component maintains unique contracts and systems to 
communicate with interagency customers and tactical 
operators.   
Each collection discipline was established to produce 
specialized intelligence products.  For example, Signals 
Intelligence yields intercept transcripts and Imagery 
Intelligence generates pictures, videos and maps.  These 
products require dedicated communication networks and 
bandwidth specifications which inherently limit the agencies 
in how they can transfer data.  Once the communication lines 
are verified by the Defense Intelligence Agency as “secure”, 
the IC is held responsible to periodically validate that the 
dissemination is still necessary and will only transfer 
intelligence in accordance with national guidelines.  
                     
3 John Pike and Steven Aftergood, “Dissemination Systems,” 
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/disseminate/index.html (accessed August 
21, 2007). 
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Human error such as negligence and oversight is 
probably the most frustrating matter for operators.   For 
example, the final intelligence product is available within 
the IC, but the warfighter down-range does not have access 
to it because of inadequate communication equipment, 
ambiguous classification guidelines or mismatched domains.  
Most Secret and Top Secret intelligence is freely exchanged 
via the Top Secret domain, the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS).4  National intelligence 
organizations generally use JWICS, but tactical operators 
are typically limited to the Secret Internet Protocol Router 
(SIPRnet) domain, thus presenting a communication barrier.   
It is not difficult for analysts to sanitize Top Secret 
reports to a Secret level, but the next step, getting the 
sanitized document transferred to the SIPRnet domain can be 
a slow, tedious process.  There are two approaches to 
alleviate these classification roadblocks.  One approach is 
to get the tactical users Top Secret equipment and Top 
Secret secure links in the field.  The second approach is to 
streamline the process of copying the data from the Top 
Secret domain and placing it on the Secret domain for more 
effective dissemination to the tactical SIPRnet users. 
There are SATCOM connections that will eventually 
assist tactical users in rapid mobile access to the Top 
Secret JWICS.  Innovative tactical systems such as the 
SATCOM Flyaway Terminal are unfortunately still in 
development and are not expected to meet DoD standards for 
                     
4 Classification levels and threats will be explained in the 
following section. 
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several years.5   Another newly introduced device is the 
Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER).6  ROVER 
was designed to provide streaming Top Secret full motion 
video to the ground troops.  The MQ-1 Predator can push the 
real-time video via line-of-sight secure link to the ROVER 
which provides ground troops a video of the current 
battlefield as it is unfolding around them.   The ROVER is 
not optimal in all situations, the receiving device is still 
over 12 lbs and the line-of-sight link limits the use in 
unsuitable terrain.  Until the equipment is pocket size and 
has a more flexible data link, the ROVER will be limited to 
preplanned operations and reinforced combat zones. 
The more effective solution is to get the data to the 
SIPRnet domain in a timely manner, because the greater 
population among tactical forces already have and routinely 
use SIPRnet.  One method the IC uses to streamline the 
transmission of sanitized Top Secret data to the S domain is 
the Information Support Server Environment (ISSE version 
3.4) guard.  The ISSE system and schema will be fully 
explained in chapter 4, but it is useful to provide a 
summary of ISSE highlights.  
Once data has been manually sanitized to meet SIPRnet 
standards, current Intelligence Directives demand that the 
data classification be verified before it is pushed to the 
                     
5 L3 Communications, “Flyaway Tri-Band SATCOM Terminal,” 
http://www.l-3com.com/products-
services/productservice.aspx?type=ps&id=214 (accessed April 10, 2007). 
6 MILTECH, “Rover Gives Joint Force New Vision,” 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/ROVER_Gives_Joint_Force_New_Vision.html, 
December 20, 2005 (accessed August 7, 2007). 
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customer.7   The automated ISSE guard scans the document and 
determines if it contains any Top Secret classification 
violations. If there are violations, the sender is notified, 
makes the necessary adjustments and sends it to through the 
ISSE guard once again.  This greatly reduces the latency 
compared to the manual verification process used up until 
the late 1980s.  The ISSE V3.4 is operational and has proven 
to be useful, but lacks an interface with e-mail and does 
not process all the necessary types of documents.8   
The upgrade, designated as ISSE Star Guard, claims that 
it can process sanitized e-mails and several new types of 
documents, including RSS and XML.  In addition, Star Guard 
has a more comprehensive procedure to verify document 
classification.   The Star Guard has several hardware 
upgrades, including a faster internal processor and greater 
bandwidth capacity.  This upgraded technology will allow the 
warfighter to get the intelligence faster and with less 
potential for classification violations.    The US Air Force 
is currently working with the ISSE developers to determine 
if the upgrade will enhance intelligence dissemination. 
Upgrades in technology are inevitable. Moore’s Law 
predicts that chip technology will continue to improve, 
doubling in speed every 18 months.9  For that reason, the IC 
has the responsibility to evaluate these technological 
                     
7 Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/3, Protecting 
Sensitive Compartmented Information within Information Systems, June 5, 
1999. 
8 Dolphin Technology Incorporated, ”Information Support Server 
Environment ISSE v3.6,” 
http://www.dolphtech.com/info%20sheets/ISSE3.6.pdf (accessed August 30, 
2007). 
9 Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits, 
Electronics (Volume 38, Number 8), April 19, 1965. 
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improvements and apply them to the intelligence cycle as 
necessary.  Air Force Intelligence recognized the usefulness 
of guard technology.  The ISSE guard automates the 
verification procedures to rapidly get sanitized data to the 
tactical operators on the SIPRnet, but is this the best 
system to use?   
As chip technology improves, so must the IC continue to 
strive toward meeting the warfighters’ demand for support in 
every regional conflict and provide cutting edge 
technological support to push transcripts, imagery, charts, 
audio and video intelligence products via whichever domain 
the customer requires. Ultimately, the point at which 
intelligence support ends and combat operations begin should 
be a seamless exchange.  
2. Associated Security Risks 
Security is critical when handling Top Secret, Secret 
and other classified data.  Based on the source and 
sensitivity of the information, data is categorized at a 
specific level of classification.  There are three basic 
levels of classification.  Each level is characterized with 
a unique degree of damage it would cause the United States 
if the classified data is compromised.  Confidential data 
would cause “damage”, Secret data would cause “serious 
damage” and Top Secret would cause “exceptionally grave 
damage” to the nation if there was an unauthorized 
disclosure.10  In order to handle classified data one must 
possess the proper security clearance, have a “need to know” 
                     
10 Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, 
March 25, 2003, Sec 1.2. 
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and have accounts to access the classified domains. Top 
Secret resides on JWICS, and both Confidential and Secret 
are on SIPRnet domains.   
There are workarounds if the operators do not have the 
proper clearances. The IC, when necessary, can sanitize Top 
Secret data but maintain the essential elements of 
information and disseminate the sanitized intelligence to 
the customer on the SIPRnet.  Generally, the data modified 
or removed during the sanitization process is not 
significant to the operator nor is it necessary to initiate 
a mission.  It is important to note that workarounds are 
temporary fixes.  They are used when there is time-sensitive 
intelligence and operations that cannot execute without it.  
These workarounds only emphasize that timely intelligence 
can make or break operations, and systems such as ISSE might 
facilitate better data exchange. 
C. THE FOCUS AND METHODOLOGY OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis addresses the problem of intelligence 
sharing between the IC and operators within the framework of 
existing intelligence directives and controls.  In order to 
enhance the intelligence sharing, one must first identify 
bottlenecks and insufficiencies, some of which are exposed 
in this thesis.  Bureaucratic factors such as the 
organization and reorganization of the IC will be examined.  
Some other factors that will be explored are the rules and 
processes that govern intelligence as well as the people and 
paradigms that degrade effective intelligence sharing.   
Technological breakthroughs and upgrades have paved the 
way for the evolution of intelligence communication and 
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dissemination over the last 50 years.  Yet the demand to get 
intelligence faster, more securely, and more accurately will 
continue to challenge the IC.  Both the current and emerging 
technology means of dissemination will be examined.  
Specifically, ISSE will be scrutinized as it is being used 
currently and how it may assist timely cross-domain 
intelligence transfer with the proposed upgrades. This 
thesis is not suggesting that these technological 
developments will solve the dissemination problems, but that 
they may facilitate a more timely process to transmit 
intelligence from the producers to the operators. 
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II. FACTORS THAT SLOW INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION 
A. OVERVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE CYCLE, THE DISCIPLINES AND 
DISSEMINATION ISSUES 
The goal for intelligence analysts is to provide 
accurate and timely intelligence to the warfighter.11  The 
IC works within the framework of the intelligence cycle, 
sometimes referred to by joint military organizations as the 
intelligence process.  After a brief summary of the 
intelligence cycle, the five main “Ints”, known as 
disciplines, will also be explained.  Once these foundations 
for intelligence production are laid out, the challenges 
within the cycle as well as the bottlenecks in the 
dissemination process will become more evident. 
 
Figure 2.   The Intelligence Cycle 
 
                     
11 Richard A. Best, CRS Report RL33539, Intelligence Issues for 









According to the CIA, the five components of the 
intelligence cycle are: Requirements, Collection, 
Exploitation, Analysis and Dissemination.12  Requirements 
are derived from operators needing to know more about events 
around the globe.  For example, military or other 
governmental officials, more commonly known as the customer, 
need to know specific data that is not readily available in 
open sources or in accessible intelligence databases.  The 
requirement is validated by collection managers who will 
determine if the desired data already exists within the IC’s 
multiple classified databases or if the data needs to be 
acquired.   
The validated requirement will then be married up to an 
“Int” or discipline and will be tasked to a specific 
collection platform within that discipline.   Once the data 
is collected, an appropriate organization will then exploit 
and analyze the data and prepare the intelligence product 
for dissemination to the customer. 
The 5 disciplines are: Imagery (IMINT), Signals 
(SIGINT), Measurement and signatures (MASINT), Human 
(HUMINT) and Open Source (OSINT).13 The intelligence cycle 
appears to be straightforward, but of course, there’s more 
to the process than a simple 5 spoke wheel.   
The IC, in its modern iteration, has been in business 
for over 50 years, so why would this process be anything 
less than a well-oiled machine, producing and disseminating 
                     
12 Director of Central Intelligence, A Consumer’s Guide to 
Intelligence (PAS 95-00010), Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1995, 3. 
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intelligence to the customer on demand?  One reason is that 
within each discipline, there are unique procedures in 
prioritizing collection tasks and classifying products. 
 
IMINT National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) 
SIGINT National Security Agency (NSA) 
HUMINT Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
MASINT Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)  
OSINT National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 
Figure 3.   Intelligence Discipline and Tasked OPR14 
 
In the IMINT and SIGINT disciplines, classification 
guidelines are clearly defined.  The data is derived from 
sources such as reconnaissance platforms like the RC-135V/W 
RIVET JOINT or the U-2 Dragon Lady. There are also multiple 
satellites that collect both SIGINT and IMINT.  The data is 
classified largely depending on the collection source. 
Generally all SIGINT and IMINT collection is initially 
classified as Top Secret.  A program called TEAR LINES 
pushes the Top Secret report once it has removed sensitive 
elements and source data but maintained the integrity of the 
report, to the Secret audiences. The customer must have the 
approved software that supports the TEAR LINE procedures.  
Routine SIGINT and IMINT customers have the standard TEAR 
LINE programs, but when sending reports to deployed 
                     
13 United States Intelligence Community, “Collection,”
http://www.intelligence.gov/2-business_cycle2.shtml(accessed September 
5, 2007). 
14 OSINT is collected by several Organizations. Foreign Broadcast 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center are not among the 16 organizations in the IC. 
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locations, often there are customers who are filtered out 
because of this software requirement. 
MASINT, as a general rule, is full of technical data 
that cannot be sanitized.  MASINT is rarely necessary in the 
field for tactical missions and hence does not traditionally 
complicate the “intelligence to the warfighter” dilemma.   
HUMINT on the other hand, presents the greatest 
challenge.  There are multiple sources, categorized by 
various standards, depending on which service, agency or 
tactical team is conducting HUMINT operations.  CIA is the 
lead for HUMINT collection, although, specialized DoD 
components had a significant role in HUMINT missions in 
recent history.  In Operation Enduring Freedom, Special 
Forces conducted several paramilitary operations alongside 
CIA operators.15 Because of the sensitivity of these 
missions and the occasional covert HUMINT collection, teams 
handled dissemination of this data with local “need to know” 
classifications.  Often, missions were part of special 
access programs and therefore the HUMINT was not forwarded 
to CIA main offices until operations were completed.   
Since 2005, when the CIA stood up the National 
Clandestine Service, cooperation among the HUMINT operators 
has improved.  The CIA Director was tasked as the National 
HUMINT Manager; therefore, he must coordinate not only CIA 
operations, but all other agencies conducting HUMINT.  This 
additional coordination should facilitate a central 
repository for all HUMINT reports and provide Special Forces 
and other operators improved access to the data. 
                     
15 Richard A. Best, CRS Report RL33539, Intelligence Issues for 
Congress (110th Congress), August 7, 2007, 18. 
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Unfortunately, some agencies use firewalls that prevent 
other JWICS users from exchanging data.  The CIA conducts 
most of their business on the CIAnet, which can pull data 
from JWICS but blocks access from non-CIA users.  
Characteristically, HUMINT is stored on CIA terminals and is 
therefore inaccessible to standard JWICS users.  Cross-
domain programs such as the ISSE guard can ease the 
communication between the different organizations, but 
communications must be initiated by the more restrictive 
network (in this case, the CIA). 
Inherently with the five disciplines, there are 
multiple standards of reports and processes for 
dissemination.  Until the IC merges their networks, 
synchronizes software, and agrees upon a common 
communications system that meets the needs of all collectors 
and customers, there will be firewalls and incompatible 
security issues among the IC networks.   
In addition to the network barriers between the 
different disciplines, there are inconsistencies within the 
bureaucratic processes within the IC. The 2004 Intelligence 
Reform reorganized the IC chain of command.  The five 
collection disciplines and how intelligence is produced and 
disseminated was not affected by the reform.  The next 
section will discuss the intelligence reform and the effects 
on the organization of the IC. 
B. ORGANIZATION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY 
Pre 9/11, the IC was organized by intelligence 
disciplines and further delineated by Area of Responsibility 
(AOR).  After the devastating terrorist attacks in 2001, the 
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IC reorganized in accordance with the 2004 Intelligence 
Reform (IR).16  The most notable difference is in the 
central focus on terrorism and the reorganization of assets 
to align trans-nationally based on the threat and not on the 
AOR.  As noted, there are 16 members in the intelligence 
community.  Each has specific areas of expertise and 
specific customers that depend on their unique capabilities 
and products.  The National Intelligence Director (DNI) was 
also established to manage the national intelligence effort.   
Previously, the DCI wore a dual hat as the head of the 
IC and Director of the CIA.  There was some debate within 
the IC as to whether the DCI was CIA biased when producing 
the President’s daily briefing.  Now, with that function 
under the DNI, the CIA’s input is calculated with the rest 
of the IC, providing a more fused product for the President.     
In addition to the DNI and the 16 members of the IC, 
the 2004 IR established cross-border centers.  These centers 
are created and terminated as necessary and are not limited 
by the regional paradigm.  The National Counterterrorism 
Center, the Counter Proliferation Center and the National 
Intelligence Center are manned as necessary and tasked to 
track global adversaries.  The missions of the 
Counterterrorism and Counter Proliferation Centers are self 
explanatory, but the National Intelligence Center’s focus 
shifts with crises and current events in accordance with 
requirements of the DNI.  Because these Intelligence Centers 
are erected by the DNI and produce and report directly on 
behalf of the DNI, they may be successful in avoiding the 
                     
16 U.S. Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004(108th Congress, Second Session), December 17, 2004, Sec 1011. 
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bureaucratic woes of the traditional intelligence 
organizations such as insufficient funds, scarce manning and 
inadequate access to all-source reporting throughout the 
IC.17   
The DNI must be cautious of redundancy and wasted 
effort when establishing a new center based on an erupting 
crisis.  For example, former Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld, had a knack for creating new organizations when he 
did not get the answers from the existing reporting cells.18 
Rumsfeld was accused of duplicating effort and tasking his 
“staff” to produce the same products that were assigned to 
the IC.  The DNI centers can avoid wasteful redundancy by 
researching the division of labor and the IC procedures for 
tasking and responsibilities.   Furthermore, the centers 
must make it a priority to interface with the IC and weigh 
all of the inputs from the multiple “ints” that might 
already be providing routine reporting on the same or 
parallel targets that are tasked to the temporary centers. 
C. INTELLIGENCE FAILURES 
How do national security critics define an intelligence 
failure?  Is it when intelligence estimates are later 
reviewed and proven to be inaccurate?  Is it when the 
military acts on current intelligence reports that detail 
the whereabouts of a high value target (HVT), but when an 
operation to kill or capture that HVT is executed, the 
target has moved on?  Intelligence is outdated within 
                     
17 U.S. Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (108th Congress, Second Session), December 17, 2004, Section 1014. 
18 Barton Gellman, Washington Post, Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld’s 
Domain, January 23, 2005, accessed September 12, 2007. 
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minutes of its collection – even with the best technology 
and real-time reporting, the movements and actions of people 
are often unpredictable.  The IC monitors and reports on the 
here and now, but almost by definition, does not control the 
movements of collection targets.   The concept of 
intelligence failure is often exacerbated by the comparison 
of many operational successes.  Operators organize and plan 
missions based on the facts provided by the IC.  Prompt and 
accurate intelligence is the backbone of every operational 
success.  Without “good intel” these missions would not 
happen.19 
Perceived intelligence failures by the customers, 
whether civilian or military, have harmful effects on future 
cooperation. When military and national security leaders 
receive intelligence briefings and estimates, they must 
understand that these briefings calculating future 
activities are subject to human nature and change.  There is 
no crystal ball to ensure the 100% accuracy when predicting 
future events.  With that said, there are analysts, sources 
and methods that are more accurate or more beneficial than 
others.   
IMINT can be effective in proving numbers, assessing 
troop strength and providing friendly forces a dimension of 
the battlefield.  However, IMINT does not provide adversary 
intentions.  Conversely, SIGINT and HUMINT reports can be 
used to calculate and act on adversary intentions.  
Generally, operators would agree that HUMINT is valued over 
most disciplines in the Global War on Terror because of the 
                     
19 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-16: Army Operational 
Support, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1995, Section 1-1. 
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candid, forthright evidence gathered from one on one 
conversation.   
Intelligence failures happen.  Post 9/11 analysts 
reviewed transcripts and reports and found there were many 
indicators that could have led authorities to apprehend the 
19 hijackers.   Certainly, it is easier to evaluate data 
after the fact, when you know what you are looking for.  
Nevertheless, that doesn’t let the IC off the hook.  
Analysts are trained to notice outliers and to report on 
suspicious activity in order to prevent attacks, especially 
within the US.  But there is a worse type of intelligence 
failure, one that is blamed on poor processes and avoidable 
oversight for which the IC is duly criticized.  
Occasionally, the IC needlessly restricts access to the 
operators because of ambiguous classification rules. The IC 
has also denied or delayed intelligence reports to operators 
because of technological shortcomings.  In cases such as 
these, the intelligence failure is simply not getting the 
information to the customers who need it.  Intelligence 
reports after the fact are only as valuable as news 
articles.   
During the Vietnam War there were numerous occasions 
when the intelligence reports never made it to the decision 
makers on the ground.  One example comes from the 
redirection of intelligence support in 1963 to big army 
units and conventional operations rather than continuing 
support to the Special Forces combating the local Viet Cong 
underground organizations.20  Another example from Vietnam 
                     
20 Andrew F. Krepinevich, jr., The Army and Vietnam, (The John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1988), 230. 
 20
is the incomplete intelligence provided for the Son Tay 
raid.  The IC provided only the details on the Son Tay 
compound and completely ignored any reporting on the 
surrounding installations.  The results were dreadful.  Just 
prior to the raid, the Viet Cong moved the POWs to a 
facility 400 meters south.  Not a single POW was rescued 
because of the narrow focus and undeveloped intelligence 
analysis.21  In 1960, the Bay of Pigs fiasco provides an 
example of CIA driven, stove-piped and biased intelligence, 
disseminated only to select audiences because of secrecy and 
politics.22  If the IC had corroborated the findings and 
there had been better communication between the military and 
the intelligence analysts, the Bay of Pigs could have had a 
happier ending.  These are the intelligence failures that 
are more detrimental to national security and degrade the 
reputation of the intelligence community.   
The avoidable failures, such as the ones mentioned, 
must be addressed.  Wider dissemination and timely reports 
to the field are objectives the IC must successfully 
address.  There is a need for an improved dissemination 
system such as ISSE, which can facilitate faster and more 
secure transfer of data. The IC needs to reinforce to 
analysts that not only do they need to develop actionable 
intelligence reports, but it is just as essential to get the 
intelligence to the operators that need it.  With faster and 
more accurate intelligence support to the customers, the 
                     
21 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations 
Warfare: Theory and Practice (Navato, CA: Presidio Press), 1995, 287. 
22 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as 
an Instrument of US Foreign Policy (New York, Oxford University Press, 
1993), 9-18. 
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interagency, inter-service trust is strengthened, which is 
imperative in coordinating national security operations.   
D. MONEY 
The Office of the DNI reviews the performance of the IC 
annually to ensure the members are accomplishing their 
assigned tasks.  There are chiefly two occasions when 
intelligence organizations are recognized by Congress or 
scrutinized by the media: in times of great success or in 
times of dismal failure.  It is logical to presume the 
organizations that are in the latter group have failed 
because of the need for manpower, resources or better 
equipment, but paradoxically, the organizations that often 
get additional funding with each annual budget proposal are 
the ones that have had the great successes.  Among the IC it 
is common to see agencies competing for priority tasking 
because of the money pot that comes with it. 
The Intelligence budget has three components. The first 
is the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), which 
primarily funds the non-DOD members of the IC.  The second 
component is the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), 
which funds DoD members and some agency tasking such as the 
NSA, NGA and NRO in support of DoD activities.  The third 
component, the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities 
(TIARA), provides funds for tactical intelligence collection 
such as airborne collection platforms and deployed military 
collection assets.   
Although the three components are already somewhat 
earmarked towards categorized tasking based on recurring 
needs, there is still room for competition when it comes to 
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new threats, new methods and current events.  When a threat 
emerges onto the center-stage, such as terrorism did in 
2001, the members of the IC propose multiple collection and 
analysis plans in order to maximize the exploitation of that 
threat.   Whatever organization receives the tasking and 
operates as the Office of Primary Responsibility will also 
get the funding to carry out the additional duties.  
Organizations will not only stand up the new offices needed 
to satisfy the added tasking, but they often use the 
additional funding to enhance collection analysis and 
reporting agency wide.   
The 9/11 Commission reviewed the U.S. intelligence 
budget in 2004 and came up with several recommendations that 
they believed would empower the IC and better support the 
overall Global War on Terrorism.23   Some of the suggestions 
are listed below: 
• Establish a DNI to oversee requests and 
appropriations for the entire IC 
• Better Congressional oversight for intelligence by 
establishing a committee that combines authorizing 
and appropriating authority 
• Balance the spending among technical capabilities 
and human intelligence 
• Prioritize National Security budget needs over 
individual agency specific tasking 
• Reprogramming or redirecting funds after the 
annual budget is approved must be a joint effort 
between Congress and the DNI 
The choke point of the IC budget is now the DNI.  This 
appears to streamline the budget procedures compared to the 
                     
23 Thomas J. Nicola, CRS Report RL32609, 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations: Intelligence Budget, September 27, 2004. 
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pre-9/11 DCI process.  Now, each IC entity has an equable 
opportunity to request annual funding.  Previously, there 
was a perceived bias that the CIA had exclusive 
consideration because of the more frequent interaction of 
the DCI with his host organization.   
How much should be spent on new and improved software, 
gadgets and collaborative tools?  The answer is reflected in 
the congressionally approved annual budget.  The amount is 
based on how well companies pitch their products to the IC.  
Each year various defense contractors coordinate with DoD 
components to develop tools and futuristic programs that can 
remedy shortfalls in intelligence collection, analysis, 
reporting and dissemination.  Often, Congress and taxpayers 
will ask for measurable results to prove effective 
performance or potential for progress in exploiting and 
defeating threats.  In 1996, the Commission on the Role and 
Capability of the US IC found that establishing the IC 
budget is not a perfect science: 
Ultimately, the Commission concluded that 
developing a precise criterion for measuring the 
right level of intelligence resources would 
inevitably be too simplistic and perhaps unwise. 
The reality, as for many functions of government, 
is that intelligence capabilities are determined 
by whatever the nation chooses to spend on them, 
not by some rigorous calculation which attempts 
to precisely balance threats against 
capabilities. Like the conduct of diplomacy, 
controlling commercial air traffic, monitoring 
weather, or defending our borders, there is 
always more that could be done. Unlike the 
precision that the government can attach to the 
cost of delivering a letter, or printing and 
delivering a Social Security check, there is no 
precise means to determine how much the nation 
should spend on intelligence. Just as with other 
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aspects of our national security, determining the 
appropriate level for intelligence funding 
requires an assessment of various criteria such 
as foreign threats and the advantages a 
particular capability can provide against such 
threats. These must then be weighed against what 
the nation can afford, given other government 
spending requirements and priorities.24 
Nevertheless, in general, the better the organization 
performs, the more tasking it will be assigned, which 
results in additional manpower and funds for that entity.   
That concept of performance based funding provides the 
foundation for the IC to continuously improve the quality 
and capabilities of their collection and analysis.  In this 
competitive arena, it will be the death of an organization 
not to expand capabilities and refine proficiencies. 
Consequently, the IC is continuously seeking to upgrade 
equipment and acquire commercial programs that can 
facilitate larger data storage, faster retrieval and 
transmission capability and most importantly, procure 
upgrades that ensure stable and secure performance.  In the 
next two chapters several prospective systems and 
collaborative tools will be discussed.   Does the cost of 
the new programs, training and maintenance support outweigh 
the benefits?  That is what intelligence acquisition 
professionals must determine as they review the emerging 
software and quasi-autonomous systems. 
 
                     
24 Commission on the Role and Capability of the US Intelligence 
Community, Preparing for the 21st Century, An Appraisal of US 
Intelligence, Washington D.C., US GPO, March 1, 1996. 
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III. GUARDS AND COLLABORATIVE TECHNOLOGIES  
A. GUARDS 
Today’s military demands better, faster intelligence.  
Millions of dollars have been spent to improve intelligence 
gathering devices. No longer must imagery analysts wait for 
photos to be developed, as high resolution, digital imagery 
can provide very high quality imagery.  Miniaturization has 
also benefited the intelligence profession, as cameras and 
recording devices have become small enough to be carried, 
inconspicuously, in any situation.  With the numerous 
advancements and technologies adopted in intelligence 
gathering, very little effort has been made to improve 
intelligence dissemination.  Dissemination of intelligence 
requires two key components. First, the intelligence must be 
spread accurately and reliably to consumers in such a time 
that allows for action to be taken.  Secondly, the sources 
and methods of intelligence gathering must be protected 
properly.  Unfortunately, intelligence professionals 
unintentionally reveal sources of the intelligence within 
routine reports.  Various technologies, such as guards and 
collaborative tools, can remedy this problem of source 
protection and dissemination. 
1. Domain Transfers 
To protect the sources and methods of intelligence 
gathering, information is originally classified at the level 
it was gathered and maintained on the proper network, 
typically on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Community 
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System (JWICS).  The main issue with machine to machine 
information sharing is that creating any link between 
different classification levels introduces the potential for 
unauthorized users to gain access to information that is 
restricted.  Therefore, each classification system resides 
on a unique domain.  The major domains used are: JWICS, 
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRnet) and the 
Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRnet).   
All of the domains are physically separated from each 
other and only authorized users can access the appropriate 
domains.  Previously, information was manually sanitized and 
downloaded onto portable media (IE floppy disk) and hand 
carried to a computer at the desired classification system.  
Obviously, this method is slow and cumbersome for today’s 
fast paced, network centric environment.  The solution to 
both the security and time aspect to the information sharing 
problem was the advent of guards.25  A guard “acts as the 
information mediator between differing levels of security 
domains (Unclassified, Secret, Top Secret, etc).  These 
guards continue to improve their messaging capabilities to 
perform functions of transliteration, sanitization, 
filtering, and routing based on operator needs and policy 
decisions”.26  One such guard that was briefly discussed in 
Chapter two is the Information Server Support Environment 
(ISSE) guard.  Currently there are over 60 ISSE guard 
                     
25 Mel Crocker, “Cross-Domain Information Sharing in a tactical 
Environment,” Journal of Defense Software Engineering March 2007, 
http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2007/03/0703Crocker.html, accessed 
May 6, 2007. (Section on CDS) 
26 Mel Crocker, “Cross-Domain Information Sharing in a 
tactical Environment,” Journal of Defense Software Engineering March 
2007, http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2007/03/0703Crocker.html, 
accessed May 6, 2007. (Technology Advances, section 1) 
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systems in use by the DOD.  Its ability to scan multiple 
file formats and user friendly software has made this system 
very valuable for the United States Air Force.27 
An ISSE guard is a computer with two network interface 
cards (NIC). One NIC is plugged into the higher 
classification server while another is plugged into the 
lower classification server.  The guard scans the data that 
travels between the two unequal domains for inappropriate 
information.28  
The ISSE guard is designed to allow email transfer 
between the two levels of security on the domains.  Once 
received by the guard the email is subjected to several 
checks to ensure no inappropriate content, including 
viruses, are passed between domains.  If the email passes 
all the security checks it is then passed to the end user 
designated by the email.  Furthermore, ISSE is able to scan 
files that are attached to emails in addition to the email 
text.  This guard allows for the potential of near real-time 
data transfer between security levels. However, this near 
real-time processing requires users on both ends to be 
present and monitoring their user accounts.  Users are 
subject to human obstacles, such as lunch breaks, less than 
24 hour coverage or user profiles that don’t allow access to 
specific files.  These hurdles can be avoided by following 
                     
27 Mel Crocker, “Cross-Domain Information Sharing in a tactical 
Environment,” Journal of Defense Software Engineering March 2007, 
http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2007/03/0703Crocker.html, accessed 
May 6, 2007. 
28 Wilson Dizard and Patience Wait, “Protecting and Sharing Data: 
Experts Discuss Cross-Domain intelligence Swapping,” GCN, April 2, 2007, 
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standard procedures of monitoring communications and 
maintaining standard computer profiles and configurations. 
2. The Problem of Hidden Data 
The most dangerous issue that exists with guard 
technology is eliminating hidden data.  Spreadsheets and 
word processors, in order to retain a high level of user-
friendliness, handle several complex background processes 
that create hidden data, unbeknownst to the creator. Hidden 
data, which includes metadata, must be removed prior to 
dissemination because it can, with the skills of computer 
savvy analyst, be uncovered by users not cleared for such 
data.   
Metadata is prevalent when there are multiple authors 
of a document. When an analyst modifies a source document 
and saves the changes, metadata remains in the file.  The 
standard procedure is to create a new document and only copy 
what is appropriate for the intended distribution list.  
Most guards only scan the surface text of these documents 
and therefore such hidden data is still able to pass 
boundaries.29   One solution to minimize the hidden data 
risk is to program the guard to reject any document that is 
capable of containing retrievable metadata.  This limitation 
might impede some intelligence exchange, but it would also 
standardize document types and formats, establishing a more 
efficient transfer process. 
Purifile is a dissemination tool that alleviates the 
problem of transferring unseen data.  Purifile was 
                     
29 Ronald Hackett, “Hidden Data: You May Be Sharing More than You 
Think,” August 21, 2006, http://federaltimes.com/index.php?S=2044545 
(accessed May 3, 2007). 
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specifically designed to identify and remove hidden data 
from Microsoft products.30  Purifile was recently named a 
2007 “Category Breaker”, in addition to receiving other 
awards, by Network World for its ability to not only detect 
hidden data, but also to discover embedded MS Office files, 
executables and macros.31  Using Purifile would allow the IC 
to be more inclusive in document transfer and have less 
document type restrictions when disseminating intelligence 
reports that are filtered through a guard. 
Even though some issues exist within guards, such as 
classified email exchange delays due to human error or gaps 
in shift work, or potential disclosure of hidden data or 
metadata, standard operating procedures among the IC can 
drastically limit the seriousness of the flaws in the guard 
systems.  Therefore, guards, such as ISSE, continue to be a 
solid choice.  Guards are arguably the fastest way of 
disseminating vital information across domains. However, 
getting intelligence onto the correct domain only solves 
half of the dissemination problem.  Once the information is 
downgraded, intelligence professionals still need to be able 
to quickly disseminate data to a wide number of operators. 
B. COLLABORATIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
Collaboration is defined as “a process characterized by 
the recursive interaction of knowledge and mutual learning 
between two or more people who are working together, in an 
                     
30 Winn Schwartau, “07 Category Breaker Award,” 
http://www.networkworld.com/bestproducts/2007/022607-best-products-
07.html (accessed November 10, 2007). 
31 Peter Stevenson, Dolphin Technology Purifile V3.1.3, November 1, 
2007, http://www.scmagazineus.com/Dolphin-Technology-PuriFile-
v313/Review/1134/ (accessed November 13, 2007). 
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intellectual endeavor, toward a common goal which is 
typically creative in nature.”32  With respect to 
information technology, Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
(CSCW) leverages technology to facilitate collaboration.  
Email, wikis, instant messengers and blogs are all examples 
of collaborative software. CSCW tools fall into one of four 
categories; those that allow same time/same place 
collaboration, those that allow same time/different place 
collaboration, those that allow different time/same place 
collaboration, and those that allow different time/different 
place collaboration as seen in the following figure. 
 
                     
32 Wikipedia, “Collaboration,” 




Figure 4.   Computer Supported Cooperative Work Matrix33 
 
With the exception of email, collaborative tools are 
largely shunned by the intelligence community.  With the 
lack of collaboration, the result is typically analysis 
accomplished in a vacuum and the product occasionally being 
distributed to a limited audience.  This narrow source 
process is time consuming, incomplete and wasteful.  
Uncorroborated intelligence is often regarded as having 
little usable data and without the use of fused reports, is 
typically outdated by the time it reaches the operator.   
 
                     
33 R.M. Baecker and Buxton Grudin and S. Greenberg, “Readings in 
Human-Computer Interaction: Towards the Year 2000”, 1995, (Second 
Edition), 
http://www.it.bton.ac.uk/staff/rng/teaching/notes/CSCWgroupware.html, 
(accessed November 13, 2007). 
 30
intellectual endeavor, toward a common goal which is 
typically creative in nature.”32  With respect to 
information technology, Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
(CSCW) leverages technology to facilitate collaboration.  
Email, wikis, instant messengers and blogs are all examples 
of collaborative software. CSCW tools fall into one of four 
categories; those that allow same time/same place 
collaboration, those that allow same time/different place 
collaboration, those that allow different time/same place 
collaboration, and those that allow different time/different 
place collaboration as seen in the following figure. 
 
                     
32 Wikipedia, “Collaboration,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collaborative (accessed November 13, 
2007). 
 33
from useful communications and filter out these unwanted or 
unnecessary emails in order to maintain effective 
communications.  Classified domains are not subject to the 
same spam problem, but with auto distribution lists, email 
can amass quickly.  Operators may receive several products 
from multiple agencies and because of the information 
overload, fail to see the few reports that had time-
sensitive intelligence.  Finally, email is a different 
time/different place collaborative tool; therefore, 
intelligence exchange may have to wait until both the sender 
and the receiver are available. 
2. Wikintelligence 
A wiki is another type of different time/different 
place collaborative tool. As defined by Wikipedia, a wiki is 
a “collaborative website which can be directly edited by 
anyone with access to it, and provides an easy method for 
linking from one page to another.”37  This online, 
collaborative, continuously updated, encyclopedia has had 
exponential growth since it’s inception in 1994.38  While 
the idea of granting anyone with computer access the ability 
to edit “at will” is precarious, the results have been 
phenomenal.   
In 2005, a wiki was established on the JWICS domain, 
called Intellipedia.  The idea was innovative, but the 
results have been disappointing.  Unfortunately, 
Intellipedia is basically still a shell with only minimal 
                     
37 Wikipedia, “Wiki,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikis (accessed 
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38 Wikipedia, “What is Wiki,” Wiki.org, 
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input.  Intellipedia is not supported or encouraged by a 
parent organization in the IC, therefore, is not getting any 
substantial contribution.   
A robust intelligence wiki could provide an online 
repository that facilitates quick edits and updates that are 
viewed in near real-time for local and deployed customers.39  
Instead of relying on daily briefs or scheduled updates from 
the IC, operators could access the wiki whenever necessary 
and get the information needed for current operations.  
“Dissemination” of actionable intelligence would be near 
instantaneous. 
Wikis also provide a unique cooperation between 
analysts from various intelligence organizations.  The 
unrestricted nature of wikis circumvents the bureaucratic 
layers that often prevent interagency collaboration.40  
Wikis, along with blogs, instant messaging, email and many 
other tools are adaptive and flexible.  Input ebbs and flows 
with the environment, priorities and current events.  
According to D. Calvin Adrus, a wiki should be considered 
only part of the “complex adaptive systems”, where the onus 
is placed equally on the analyst and on the tools to be 
receptive and adaptable.  It is the responsibility of the 
analyst to combine these interdependent collaborative tools 
in order to provide multi-source, real-time, intelligence to 
the warfighter.41   
                     
39 Edits must be provided by credible sources.  Once a source is 
verified, unrestricted edits are permitted. 
40 D. Calvin Adrus, “The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive 
Intelligence Community,” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=755904, abstract 
(accessed November 12, 2007). 
41 Andrus, “The Wiki and the Blog,” 24. 
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The IC has struggled with providing timely and accurate 
cultural intelligence for conflicts around the globe.  With 
the cooperation of academia and corporate allies, the IC 
could establish a wiki designed to provide aspects of 
culture, politics and anthropologic data.  Analysis of 
societal and economic data is often left out of the target 
dossier.  Wikis could be the missing link for the cultural 
intelligence that is lacking in today’s war.42 
It would be optimal to give certain academia and 
corporate facilitators access to the classified wikis, but 
unfortunately the process of granting security clearances to 
such a large audience of non intelligence professionals 
would be complicated and costly. 
Critics of the Intelligence wiki raise some valid 
points in using wikis as a “one stop shop”.  One criticism 
stems from clearance levels and cross domain exchanges for 
each topic.  Most intelligence collection and analysis is 
done at the Top Secret level but the operators that need the 
data are generally only cleared to Secret.  Also, wikis must 
be established and routinely updated at each classification 
level in order to maximize the exploitation of specific 
topics and to get the data to the warfighter in a timely 
manner.  In 2005, the DNI was tasked with improving open 
source access to the IC.43  The Open Source Center was 
created to merge multiple unclassified news centers and make 
the data available in wiki format.  Most intelligence 
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25. 
43 The 9/11 Commission also noted that the IC was “severely 
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analysts are familiar with reports from the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Center (FBIS); the Open Source Center 
absorbed FBIS tasking and expanded the collection of such 
unclassified information within the wiki.44 Operators will 
agree that a “one stop shop” for open source data will 
improve situational awareness, but the IC must not forget 
that an open source wiki is not a replacement for thorough 
research.  Furthermore, open source must be combined with 
multiple sources and “ints” to determine the validity of the 
reports.  
The Open Source Center restricts access to government 
related personnel and attempts to validate users as U.S. 
citizens or government employees.  A logon and password is 
required, but despite the security measures applied to the 
unclassified website, the risk of disclosure and hacking is 
not only possible, but probable.  Therefore, inputs on the 
open source wiki will be, according to Executive Order 
12958, restricted to information that does not pose any risk 
to national security, if compromised. 
Even though the IC is skeptical of a merged, multi-
source data repository, wikis have the potential to be a 
valuable resource for intelligence professionals and 
deployed operators.  The Open Source Center’s wiki will 
certainly aid in data dissemination on the NIPRnet. If 
Intellipedias on SIPRnet and JWICS become as populated and 
comprehensive as Wikipedia the IC might finally bridge the 
gap between intelligence producers and intelligence 
customers. 
                     
44 Open Source Center, wiki, https://www.opensource.gov (accessed 
November 18, 2007). 
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3. Instant Messengers 
Instant messengers are same time/different place 
collaborative tools rising in popularity.  Instant messaging 
programs are almost as common as email for electronic 
communication.45  With the continuous upgrades in instant 
messaging capabilities as well as the wide range of 
compatibility among operating systems it is no surprise that 
this real-time chat tool is only second to email when 
comparing quantities of electronic communications.  Cellular 
phone companies are catching on to the phenomenon.  Most 
cell phone plans now come with standard text and instant 
messaging services. This real time tool offers several 
advantages to the intelligence community. 
The primary advantage provided by instant messengers is 
the speed of information sharing.  During an instant 
messaging or chat session all users are online, or actively 
monitoring the session in one virtual space.  This allows 
for the data to be transferred and read instantly, as 
opposed to email where, unless the exchange is prearranged 
for a set time, it is not guaranteed that the intended 
receiver will be present.  Furthermore, messaging chat 
sessions are a valuable tool to actively exchange real time 
information and provide in depth analysis simultaneously as 
situations unfold.  In addition to text, instant messaging 
programs are incorporating video and voice to their programs 
which will greatly enhance collaboration among users. 
                     
45 DM Review Editorial Staff, “Email Study Reveals Trend in Usage,” 
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(accessed November 13, 2007). 
 38
The speed of instant messengers is also one of its 
greatest disadvantages.  With email communication a user has 
time to read and absorb any information or intelligence 
request submitted.  With instant messengers, however, users 
are communicating in real time with the expectation to 
deliver the information now, as opposed to taking the time 
to research and possibly providing a more comprehensive 
analysis.  Also, email has a greater capacity to send 
attachments such as word documents, power point 
presentations and imagery that the end user can peruse at 
their leisure.  While some updated messenger services 
provide an ability to attach small files most are limited to 
simple, either text or voice based, real time 
communications.  Despite these limitations, instant 
messengers remain a viable collaborative means that can be 
utilized by intelligence professionals.  The speed of 
information delivery and concurrent amplification is 
essential to tactical decision makers, where timely answers 
are vital.  When rapid delivery is not as crucial, 
collaborative tools such as email might be more effective 
for both operators and intelligence professionals. 
4. Groove 
Unlike the aforementioned collaborative tools, 
Microsoft Office Groove, simply referred to as Groove, 
resides in two areas of the collaborative tools matrix.  
Unique features, such as application sharing and open access 
workspace enable different time/different place 
collaboration.  In addition, Groove offers a chat feature 
that can enable same time/different place collaboration. 
Groove is a peer to peer collaborative tool that enables 
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users to create a shared workspace for multiple user 
collaboration.  This workspace is a repository where users 
can place all relevant information for an ongoing project.46  
The actual data is stored on each member’s personal computer 
which facilitates fast document retrieval.  Users can also 
update and add to the project and post the new information 
to the workspace individually. 
Groove presents many practical features that are not 
offered in traditional email or instant messengers.  First, 
the peer to peer nature of Groove eliminates the possibility 
of a single point of failure for data loss.  Instead, data 
is kept on the machines of individual users automatically, 
as opposed to the manual method or server storage employed 
by most email tools.  Next, Groove allows users to 
efficiently change a stored document; the changes are 
immediately posted to the workspace and all of the users are 
notified that there is an updated version of the document 
available.  Both of these features ensure the latest 
analysis is available to multiple operators in multiple 
locations around the globe.  Finally, the built-in chat 
mode, like the instant messenger, allows for real-time 
coordination and clarification of intelligence reports.   
There is one major disadvantage with implementing 
Groove. The program’s size and bandwidth are more demanding 
than most applications.  Computer networks among the IC will 
have no problem using the application, but deployed 
operators using field laptops might not have the memory or 
                     
46 Stephen Burdian and Jadon Klopson, “Collaborative Applications 
used in a Wireless Environment at Sea for use in Coast Guard Law 
Enforcement and Homeland Security Missions,” Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 17. 
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connection speed required.  The minimum requirements for 
Groove are 52 kilobit per second modem, 256 megabits of RAM, 
and a 400 megahertz processor, however, a high-speed 
connection, such as a cable modem, and 512 megabits of RAM 
are needed for full optimization.  Groove has incorporated 
several features to optimize bandwidth, but this area still 
has room for improvement.47 
Overall, Groove’s collaboration features, along with 
the common applications such as calendar and project 
manager, make it a very powerful intelligence analysis and 
dissemination tool.  In fact, Groove is currently being used 
in such a manner by the Department of Homeland Security, in 
support of high profile events, such as the Republican and 
Democratic National Conventions.48 
                     
47 Stephen Burdian and Jadon Klopson, “Collaborative Applications 
used in a Wireless Environment at Sea for use in Coast Guard Law 
Enforcement and Homeland Security Missions,” Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 21-24. 
48 Stephen Burdian and Jadon Klopson, 28. 
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IV. FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES  
There are several emerging collaborative tools that 
might facilitate analysis and dissemination for Intelligence 
Community. One such tool is the Small Unit Situational 
Awareness tool (SUSA). The SUSA system is a stand alone 
operating system and does not have long term storage or 
fusion functions that integrate with other systems such as 
Groove.  The SUSA does, however, provide the ability to 
process, analyze and exchange situational awareness 
information within a small tactical team.  The SUSA system 
shares real-time situational and geographical data between 
the SUSA team leader, the SUSA team members and a Tactical 
Operations Center.  The SUSA system provides each member of 
the tactical team with the following capabilities: 
• Provides teams with real-time individual tracking. 
• Allows users to mark pinpoint locations on a map 
using a system stylus. 
• Promotes the use of multiple situational and 
graphical databases that can be shared across the 
network. 
• Enhances battlefield management through extensive 
mapping utilities. 
• Extends the communication network through the use 
of handheld sized data radios or WI-FI capability.  
The messaging utility provides an additional means 
of sending and receiving tactical orders, reports 
and information while in the field. 
• Enables teams to view and share data regarding the 
hostile situation. 
When used in a networked command center environment, 
the SUSA application provides each member of the tactical 
team with a Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP).  
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Each user on the tactical network can then customize the 
CROP for his particular role by using a variety of re-
configurable toolbars.  Distributed planning is accomplished 
via creating a file, sharing it with the other players on 
the network, and then allowing the other players to "mark 
up" the shared plan.  This sharing is a real-time 
interactive planning capability which allows multiple role 
players to simultaneously build and alter a tactical plan 
utilizing white board technology.49   
The SUSA system allows operators to communicate in a 
free-form instant message manner, to submit/receive standard 
reports and message traffic and to generate and share 
operational graphics.  Although the current SUSA system does 
not allow for audio/video communications between the SUSA 
team members, future systems are in the works that would 
incorporate voice and full motion video. 
One final tool worth discussing is the Collaboration 
Gateway (CG). CG is a tool that allows for multilevel, 
cross-domain collaboration50.  CG is the final piece of the 
puzzle that connects both guard and collaborative 
technologies for rapid intelligence dissemination across 
security levels. Instead of actively screening for 
unauthorized data as the ISSE does, the CG instead monitors, 
sorts and temporarily stores data as it flows between 
domains.  
                     
49 CHI Systems Incorporated, User Manual for GPS-Denied Navigation & 
Mapping System (SOF Tracker), July 15, 2007. 
50 John Teresko, “Technologies Of The Year, Proficiency Inc.'s 
Collaboration Gateway,” December 1, 2004, 
http://www.industryweek.com/CurrentArticles/asp/articles.asp?ArticleId=1
708 (accessed November 13, 2007). 
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Not only does it claim to rapidly push data between 
domains, it can also serve as a temporary back-up for data 
retrieval.  
Technology has provided a number of tools beneficial to 
the IC.  Cross-domain guards, like ISSE and STAR, ensure 
that vital information is protected while allowing a means 
to transfer useful intelligence to operators on lower 
classification systems. Also, various collaborative 
technologies can aide intelligence professionals in quickly 
disseminating actionable intelligence.  While flaws do exist 
in current guard and collaborative technologies, none are so 
serious that they cannot be overcome with proper practices.  
If the intelligence community, however, is unwilling to 
embrace current and future technologies, such as the 
Collaboration Gateway, intelligence failures will become 
more frequent while operational successes will dwindle. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Since 2001, the Intelligence Community has been 
scrutinized by Congress, by government decision makers and 
by general pubic.  Several changes were made over the last 
six years based on the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act and 
other legislation enacted post 9/11.  The common notion in 
analyzing how the IC conducts business is the concept that 
the Intelligence Community should always seek to provide the 
most accurate and actionable intelligence to the operational 
customers, especially to the customers forward deployed, 
also known as the warfighters.  Furthermore, the 
intelligence professionals must ensure that the data 
transfers to each and every customer are secure, but not at 
the expense of delaying the process. 
The IC was reorganized in 2004 and has a modified chain 
of command.  The DNI position was designed to remedy and 
streamline authorities and procedures.  With a more 
efficient hierarchy, the DNI theoretically will have a 
better perspective on which organizations are performing 
well, and which are more suited to take on new tasking.  The 
competition among the IC, as pointed out in chapter two, 
will force organizations to continuously progress.   
Amid the 16 organizations of the IC, there are numerous 
systems and domains that each organization primarily uses.  
Unless the IC is mandated to merge domains, there must be 
workarounds and multiple methods to exchange data within and 
beyond the IC.  There needs to be effective and systematic 
practices to send data from the Top Secret realm down to the 
users on the SIPRnet and NIPRnet domains and vice versa.  
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The difficulty in cross-domain exchange is at the pinnacle 
of bottleneck delays when it comes to getting the right 
intelligence to the right customer in order to exploit and 
affect adversaries in today’s global war on terrorism.  
Therefore it is critical to the DoD and the Intelligence 
Community to seek out the best solutions to advance data 
transfer and data security. 
In search of the best programs and equipment to support 
the warfighter, several commercial companies have designed 
products that facilitate data transfer and automated data 
analysis.   Chapters three and four discuss the potential 
tools that the military and the Intelligence Community can 
procure.  Email and instant messaging were the first of many 
tools to ease communication between operators down-range and 
the IC, facilitating a quick link for the initial flow of 
information.   Wikis in the classified arena have potential, 
but must be supported, populated and maintained before they 
can be fully appreciated by analysts and operators.   Groove 
and SUSA offer features that can generate more integrated, 
in-depth exploitation as well as provide near real-time 
communication.  The few ISSE guard systems that are being 
used across the IC have proven to ease the bottleneck in 
data transfer to the warfighter since its inception in 1998.  
The new and improved ISSE guard looks promising, but will 
have to compete with the other data guard candidates and 
collaborative tools on the market.   It is paramount that 
the leadership of the IC ensures that analysts have multiple 
collaborative tools available, and the analysts must be 
proactive in maximizing these tools to exploit the 
adversaries.  In WWII the Germans were the first to use 
 47
radar and advanced navigation tools.51  The British first 
employed collection and decryption systems at Bletchley 
Park.52  The US was the first to develop the atom bomb.53  As 
history demonstrates, the implications of cutting edge 
technology may not have won wars, but did impact strategies 
and benefited the users by staying one step ahead of the 
enemy.  Accordingly, today’s Intelligence Community must 
seek out cutting edge tools in order to stay one step ahead 
of the enemy.  
                     
51 Robert O’Connell, Soul of the Sword (Free Press, August 27, 
2002), 286-292. 
52 F.H. Hinsley and Alan Strip, Codebreakers: The Inside Story of 
Bletchley Park (Oxford University Press, USA, June 21, 2001), 312-320. 
53 Robert O’Connell, Soul of the Sword (Free Press, August 27, 
2002), 320-322. 
 48
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 49
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Andrus, Calvin. (2004).“The Wiki and the Blog:Toward a 
Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community.” Retrieved on 
November 12, 2007 from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=7559
04. 
Baecker, R.M. and Grudin, Buxton and Greenburg. (1995). 
“Readings in Human-Computer Interaction:Towards the 




Best, Richard. (2007).CRS Report RL33539. Intelligence 
Issues for Congress,110th Congress. 
Burdian, Stephen and Klopson, Jadon. (2007). “Collaborative 
Applications used in a Wireless Environment at Sea for 
use in Coast Guard Law Enforcement and Homeland 
Security Missions.” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
CHI Systems Incorporated. (2007). User Manual for GPS-Denied 
Navigation & Mapping System:SOF Tracker. 
Commission on the Role and Capability of the US Intelligence 
Community. (1996). Preparing for the 21st Century, An 
Appraisal of US Intelligence, Washington D.C., US GPO. 
Crocker, Mel. (2007). “Cross-Domain Information Sharing in a 
tactical Environment.” Journal of Defense Software 
Engineering March 20076,2007 from 
http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2007/03/0703Crock
er.html. 
Director of Central Intelligence. (1995). A Consumer’s Guide 
to Intelligence. PAS 95-00010. Washington, DC: Central 
Intelligence Agency. 
Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/3. (1999). 
Protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information within 
Information Systems. Washington, DC: Central 
Intelligence Agency. 
 50
Dizard, Wilson and Wait, Patience. (2007). “Protecting and 
Sharing Data: Experts Discuss Cross-Domain intelligence 
Swapping.” GCN. Retrieved on May 6, 2007 from 
http://www.gcn.com/print/26_07/43404-1.html. 
DM Review Editorial Staff. (2005). “Email Study Reveals 
Trend in Usage.” Retrieved on November 13, 2007 from 
http://www.dmreview.com/article_sub.cfm?articleId=10447
71. 
Dolphin Technology Incorporated. (2006). ”Information 
Support Server Environment ISSE v3.6.” Retrieved on 
August 30, 2007 from 
http://www.dolphtech.com/info%20sheets/ISSE3.6.pdf. 
Executive Order 12958. (2003). Classified National Security 
Information. 
Gellman, Barton. (2005). Washington Post. Secret Unit 
Expands Rumsfeld’s Domain. 
Hackett, Ronald. (2006). “Hidden Data: You May Be Sharing 
More than You Think.” Retrieved on May 3, 2007, from 
http://federaltimes.com/index.php?S=2044545. 
Hinsley, F.H. and Strip, Alan. (2001). Codebreakers:The 
Inside Story of Bletchley Park. Oxford University 
Press, USA. 
Krepinevich, Andrew F., jr. (1988). The Army and Vietnam. 
John Hopkins University Press. Baltimore and London. 
L3 Communications. (2007). “Flyaway Tri-Band SATCOM 
Terminal.” Retrieved on April 10, 2007, from 
http://www.l-3com.com/products-
services/productservice.aspx?type=ps&id=214. 
McRaven, William. (1995). Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special 
Operations Warfare:Theory and Practice. Navato, CA: 
Presidio Press. 
MILTECH. (2005). “Rover Gives Joint Force New Vision.” 




Moore, Gordon. (1965). Cramming More Components Onto 
Integrated Circuits, Electronics. Volume 38, Number 8. 
Nicola, Thomas. (2004). CRS Report RL32609, 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations: Intelligence Budget. 
O’Connell, Robert. (2002). Soul of the Sword. Free Press. 
Open Source Center. (2007). Wiki. Retrieved on November 18, 
2007, from https://www.opensource.gov. 
Pike, John and Aftergood, Steven. (2007). “Dissemination 
Systems.” Retrieved on August 21, 2007, from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/disseminate/index.html. 
Schwartau, Winn. (2007). “07 Category Breaker Award.” 
Retrieved on November 10, 2007, from 
http://www.networkworld.com/bestproducts/2007/022607-
best-products-07.html. 
Stevenson, Peter. (2007). “Dolphin Technology Purifile 
V3.1.3.” Retrieved on November 13, 2007, from 
http://www.scmagazineus.com/Dolphin-Technology-
PuriFile-v313/Review/1134. 
Teresko, John. (2004). “Technologies Of The Year, 
Proficiency Inc.'s Collaboration Gateway.” Retrieved on 
November 13, 2007, from 
http://www.industryweek.com/CurrentArticles/asp/article
s.asp?ArticleId=1708. 
United States Congress. (2004). Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 108th Congress, 
Second Session. 
United States Department of the Army. (1995). Field Manual 
100-16: Army Operational Support, Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office. 
United States Intelligence Community. (2007). “Collection.” 
Retrieved on September 5, 2007, from 
http://www.intelligence.gov/2-business_cycle2.shtml. 
Vandenbroucke, Lucien. (1993). Perilous Options: Special 
Operations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy. New 
York, Oxford University Press. 
 52
Whittaker, Bellotti and Moody, P. (2007). “Revisiting and 
Reinventing email, Human Computer Interaction 20." 
Retrieved on November 13, 2007, from http://hci-
journal.com/editorial/si-email-intro.pdf. 
Wikipedia. (2007).“Collaboration.” Retrieved on November 13, 
2007, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collaborative. 
Wikipedia. (2007). “What is Wiki,” Wiki.org. Retrieved on 
November 13, 2007, from 
http://www.wiki.org/wiki.cgi?WhatIsWiki. 
Wikipedia. (2007). “Wiki.” Retrieved on November 10, 2007, 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikis. 
Zahn, Matt and Lasey, Wayne. (2007). “Building a Virtual 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
  
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 














6. HQ USSOCOM Library 
taitt@socom.mil 
Tampa, Florida 
